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Abstract—Currently there is an active Post-Quantum 
Cryptography (PQC) solutions search, which attempts to find 
cryptographic protocols resistant to attacks by means of for instance 
Shor’s polynomial time algorithm for numerical field problems like 
integer factorization (IFP) or the discrete logarithm (DLP). The use 
of non-commutative or non-associative structures are, among 
others, valid choices for these kinds of protocols. In our case, we 
focus on a permutation subgroup of high order and belonging to the 
symmetric group S381. Using adequate one-way functions (OWF), we 
derived a Diffie-Hellman key exchange and an ElGamal ciphering 
procedure that only relies on combinatorial operations. Both OWF 
pose hard search problems which are assumed as not belonging to 
BQP time-complexity class. Obvious advantages of present 
protocols are their conceptual simplicity, fast throughput 
implementations, high cryptanalytic security and no need for 
arithmetic operations and therefore extended precision libraries. 
Such features make them suitable for low performance and low 
power consumption platforms like smart cards, USB-keys and 
cellphones. 
     
Keywords – Post-Quantum Cryptography, Non-Commutative 
Cryptography, Symmetric groups, Permutations, Diffie-Hellman 
key exchange, ElGamal cipher, Combinatorial analysis.  
  
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
ost-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) is a relatively new 
cryptologic trend [1, 2] that acquired a NIST status [3, 4] 
and which aims to be resistant to quantum computers attacks 
(like Shor algorithm [5]). Two main lines of research are non-
commutative cryptography (NCC) [6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13] 
and non-associative cryptography (NAC) [13, 14, 15, 16, 17]. 
Belonging to the first category, this paper pursues the 
development of a fast and cryptanalytically secure solution 
using high order permutations [18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23].   The 
protocol is extremely simple and could be directly adapted to 
any kind of asymmetric solutions like key exchange, key 
transport, generalized ElGamal ciphering and ZKP 
authentication [24, 25,26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 32, 33]. The 
keystone here is to work with a high multiplicative order 
random permutation group <p>, belonging to the non-
commutative symmetric group S381 [18, 19, 20]. To achieve 
such performance, a carefully mix of randomness and 
structured symmetry was designed into the target permutation 
p.  
Security of an asymmetric cipher protocol always relies on a 
one-way function (OWF) [24]. For instance, using the 
decomposition problem (DP) or the double coset problem 
(DCP) [7], both assumed to belong to AWPP time-complexity 
(but out of BQP) [34] problems, which lead to an eventual 
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brute-force attack, thus yielding high computational security. 
The cryptographic use of combinatorial structures like 
permutations is a long-known matter, either in linear way [20] 
or in two-dimensional combination like Row Latin Squares 
(RLS) [21, 22] or simply using quasigroups [23]. There are also 
patented protocols about [35]. Multidimensional tensor 
solutions are also conceivable, but their utility remains unclear. 
Other approaches into the same direction are the use of multiple 
orthogonal latin squares (MOLS) [36] and the use of non-group 
based latin squares [38]. More information about PQC, NCC 
and NAC could be found at published works and their own 
references. 
2. SOME STRUCTURAL DETAILS 
 
Permutations are simple combinatorial structures [20, 36]. A 
convenient way to map them as integers is the use of Lehmer’s 
factoradic representation [38, 39]. An optimal random 
permutation generation with an O(n) algorithm is described in 
[20] as Fisher-Yates-Durstenfeld Algorithm P.  
It is a known fact that the order of any permutation is the 
least common multiple of it independent cycle lengths [40]. So 
a simple way to construct a random high order group, is to 
embed any random permutation (say p) into prime length cycles 
using the increasing prime sequence [41] in random order. 
Summing those cycle lengths; one obtains the symmetric group 
orders into which the random permutation works as a generator 
of a cyclic subgroup, whose order is given by the respective 
primorial function [42]. A valid choice for the dimension of 
those lists that guarantee at same time high GDLP 
cryptographic security and does not deter computational 
throughput, is the value 16.  Figure 1 displays the sixteen prime 
cycles, the defined S381 group and the resulting 64-bits order of 
the cyclic subgroup <p>.  
 
 
 
Figure 1. Parameter definitions. The last value of the second and third lists 
are respectively the selected order of the symmetric group and the order of the 
cyclic subgroup generated by a random permutation whose cycle lengths are 
given by the first list. 
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3. DIFFIE-HELLMAN PROTOCOL 
 
Using above mentioned structures and operations, a 
generalized Diffie-Hellman key exchange is outlined at Figure 
2. 
 
 
 
Figure 2.  Generalized Diffie-Hellman key exchange 
 
The procedure is easy to follow with a numeric trial, as 
exposed separately in APPENDIX I, with same symbols as 
defined in Figure 2. 
Using previous arguments and bearing in mind that neither 
polynomial time conventional DLP attack nor a quantum 
procedure against it is at hand; the computational security is 
assumed to be of 64-bits.  
The protocol works fast, using a non-optimized Mathematica 
interpreted code implementing a “square and multiply” routine 
and working on a ®Core i5 PC @ 2.20GHz, the session mean 
time took 93,75 ms over a sample of 1000000 cycles. 
4. ELGAMAL CIPHER 
Our version has his cryptographic security based on the 
double coset problem (DCP) or respectively, the decomposition 
problem (DP) as the one-way functions [7].  
DCP or DP are supposedly hard challenges in group theory. 
As no quantum attack algorithm over symmetric groups is on 
sight and probably does not exist, these solutions do not belong 
to BQP complexity set. Of course, this statement should be 
proven; a challenge outside the purpose of present work.  
We present here both approaches. The general procedure is 
outlined at following figures. 
 
 
 
Figure 3a.  Generalized ElGamal cipher using DCP as OWF 
 
 
 
Figure 3b.  Generalized ElGamal cipher using DP as OWF 
 
Again, we proceed with a stepwise example. It is included at 
APPENDIX I using the DCP variation. All used symbols 
agreed with Figure 3a definitions. 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
 
We developed a PQC solution using the symmetric group as 
the embedding structure. This approach fits into non-
commutative cryptography.  The random selection of high order 
elements is easy to obtain and lead naturally into big cyclic 
subgroups, where the DCP or the DP are hard to solve. 
Permutation group operations like integer mapping, 
compositions (multiplications) and it powers, have easy 
solutions.  It relies only on simple combinatorial operations, no 
need of arithmetic or big-number libraries.   This feature would 
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enable its use in low computational resources environments like 
cellphones, smart cards, etc. 
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(1) Generalized Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange 
 
 
 
Figure 1. Random permutation p,  generator of the cyclic subgroup <p> 
belonging to S381. This public value could be concerted in advance or 
transferred to the second entity by the initiator. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Embedded cycle lengths of p and cyclic subgroup <p> order, both 
public and fixed parameters. 
 
Once the generator is concerted, the protocol follows as 
usual with the selection of random secret exponents for each 
entity and subsequent exchange of public tokens.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Alice and Bob randomly selected secret exponents {a.b} 
 
 
Figure 4. Alice public token ta=p
a
. 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Bob public token tb=p
b 
 
 
 
APPENDIX I: STEP BY STEP NUMERIC EXAMPLES OF THE GENERALIZED                   
DIFFIE-HELLMAN KEY EXCHANGE AND GENERALIZED ELGAMAL CIPHER 
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Finally, both obtain a common session key because <p> has 
cyclic structure and powers commute. 
 
  
 
Figure 6. Alice key=(tb)
a 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Bob key=(ta)
b 
 
 
 (2) Generalized ElGamal Cipher  
Here we use the Fig 3a. variation based on DCP. 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Public <p> generator. 
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Figure 8. Public auxiliar permutation 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Alice private values  
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Figure 10. Bob private values  
 
 
 
 
Figure 11. Public keys (Alice, Bob)  
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Figure 11. Alice session key and message  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 12. ElGamal cipher pair (y1,y2) 
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Figure 13. Bob recovered message 
 
